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ARTICLE

TIERED CONSENT AND
THE TYRANNY OF CHOICE
Natalie Ram*
ABSTRACT: Regulations and doctrine governing human tissue research are facing
immense pressure to ensure respect for the interests of tissue providers and of researchers. Tiered consent presents tissue providers with a menu of research categories to
which they may consent, and it is a recognized best practice. Yet, evidence in consumer
psychology suggests that abundant choice causes decision makers to experience information overload, make arbitrary choices, refrain from choosing altogether, and experience regret following decision making. These patterns result in systematically lower
quality decision making. This article fleshes out the potential limitations of expanded
choice in tiered consent situations so that use of this best practice, and the laws and
doctrine governing it, best approaches the ethical paradigm of informed consent.

CITATION: Natalie Ram, Tiered Consent and the Tyranny of Choice, 48 lurimetrics
1. 253-284 (2008).
"Nequid nimis.,,1 (In all things moderation.)
In modern medicine, informed consent is a touchstone of ethical and legal
practice. Physicians must generally obtain freely given and informed consent
from patients before engaging in most medical interventions (except in certain
circumstances, such as emergencies or where full information would, in fact,
be detrimental to patient health), and researchers are held to an even stricter

*Law Clerk, Hon. Guido Calabresi, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; J.D., Yale
Law School, 2008. I am grateful to Fran~oise Baylis and Lynette Reid, with whom my work on
tiered consent first began, and to my parents, whose love of science has nurtured my own (and
whose editorial suggestions are always helpful). Special thanks also to Adam Banks, Christine
Jolls, Dan Kahan, Judith Resnik, Reva Siegel, Larry Solan, and the Yale Law Teaching-Yale Law
Women Works in Progress participants for their insightful comments and expert guidance.
\. PuBLlUS TERENTIUS AFER (TERENCE), ANDRIA (THE GIRL FROM ANDROS) act I, sc. I
(G.P. Shipp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1960).
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standard to divulge material risks in obtaining participant consent. Yet, informed consent requires much more than simply the provision of information,
and obtaining adequate consent can be difficult as science moves forward and
human tissue is its medium for experimentation. With the advent of genetic
analysis, researchers hope to identify disease-related and other genes and to
measure the frequency of such genes' occurrence across large populations.
This kind of research requires massive cross-sectional bio-repositories of samples available for study. At the tum of the century, there were already more
than 300 million tissue samples from more than 178 million individuals stored
in the United States, and this number grows by more than 20 million samples
every year. 2
Careful consideration of the process of consent in the context of medical
research using human tissues is needed. Although consent for research purposes is not a new concept, consent for the research use of human tissues
poses new ethical problems. Unlike other kinds of research involving human
subjects, research using human tissues can extend over long periods of time
and a single sample may be used in multiple (potentially unrelated) studies. In
this sense, human tissue research is unique among research involving human
subjects because of the scope of potential choice available to tissue providers-in theory, tissue providers might wish to consent to one, many, or all
kinds of research, present and into the future.
Federal regulations and judicial doctrine govern large swaths of research
involving human subjects, but, as yet, agencies and courts have been unwilling
to apply the necessary protections of informed consent to human tissue research. 3 Our national commitments to creating regulations for the ethical conduct of research,4 however, and our interests in facilitating effective and
efficient research both point to the need for reform. Policymakers, ethicists,
and researchers must find ways to adapt traditional doctrines and policies of
informed consent to situations in which as few as one consent-generating
interaction may give rise to mUltiple uses of a person's tissue, genetic information, or other personal data.
Tiered consent-which presents potential tissue providers with a menu of
research categories to which they may consent-has been proposed as a "best

2. ELISA EISEMAN & JASEN J. CASTILW, HANDBOOK OF HUMAN TISSUE SOURCES: A
NATIONAL RESOURCE OF HUMAN TISSUE SAMPLES, at xvii (1999), available at http://www.rand.
orglpubs/monograph_reportslMR954IMR954.sum.pdf. In 1998, the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC) similarly reported that more than 282 million tissue samples were stored in
the United States, accumulating at a rate of more than 20 million new samples per year. NAT'L
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, REsEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOWGICAL MATERIALS:
ETHICAL IsSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 13 (1999), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edul
nbaclhbm.pdf.
3. See infra Part LB.
4. See NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL
REsEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979).
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practice" for moving forward ethically with human tissue research. s The availability of options enables providers to exercise some level of control over the
future use of their tissues, while limiting the administrative and other burdens
that diminish the effectiveness of consent models requiring frequent recontact.
However, recent data emerging about consumer psychology raise flags about
the shortcomings of radically expanded choice. These data indicate that while
some choice appears to be beneficial-and therefore tiered consent is likely to
remain a best practice-too much choice actually causes anxiety in decision
makers as well as attempts to opt out of decision making altogether or to
choose at random.6 There is good reason to believe that these behavior patterns
will manifest as strongly, if not more so, in the context of tiered consent. 7
Therefore expanding the choices available to tissue providers too much will
undermine, rather than buttress, the principles underlying informed consent.
These findings are of no small import; national regulation and judicial doctrine
playa central role in establishing boundaries for ethical research in the United
States. Thus, policymakers, as well as bioethicists and legal scholars, need to
account for the effects of abundant choice in identifying, advocating for, and
implementing appropriate consent guidelines for human tissue research.
This article aims to flesh out the potential limitations of expanded choice
in tiered consent situations so that use of this best practice, and the laws and
doctrine governing it, best approaches the ethical paradigm of informed consent. Although the ethical components of informed consent for the use of human tissue in research, as well as their implementation in law, have been the
subject of much discussion, authors have neglected the insights into decision
making offered by studies in behavioral economics and decision-making psychology. 8 Likewise, most scholars of behavioral economics and decisionmaking psychology have not paid significant attention to the interactions
between their findings and the principles of informed consent generally, much
less tiered consent. This article begins to fill in these blanks. Part I provides a
5. See, e.g., NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 64-65; ELISA EISEMAN
ET AL., CASE STUDIES OF EXISTING HUMAN TISSUE REPOSITORIES: "BEST PRACfICES" FOR A
BIOSPECIMEN RESOURCE FOR THE GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC ERA 137 (2003); Natalie Ram,
Regulating Consent to Human Embryo Research: A Critique of Health Canada's Proposal, 14
HEALTH L. REV. 19 (2005).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part m.
8. See, e.g., Ellen Wright Clayton et aI., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored
Tissue Samples, 274 JAMA 1786 (1995) (presenting the consensus statement emerging from a
workshop of scientists, ethicists, lawyers, and consumers convened by the National Institutes of
Health and the Centers for Disease Control and advocating a tiered consent and recontact model
for the use of human tissue in research); Philip R. Reilly et aI., Ethical Issues in Genetic Research:
Disclosure and Informed Consent, 15 NATURE GENETICS 16 (1997) (arguing for broader
disclosure in infonned consent to the use of tissue for gene mapping research); David Wendler,
One-Time General Consent for Research on Biological Samples: Is It Compatible With the Health
Insurance Ponability and Accountability Act?, 166 ARCHNES INTERNAL MED. 1449 (2006)
(arguing that a two-step consent process is required to comply with the requirements of HIPAA).
See generally 2 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE: COMMISSIONED PAPERS
(2000), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edulnbaclhbmII.pdf.
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primer on the notion of "informed consent," explicating why informed consent
is essential to ethical and productive research using human tissues, describing
the ethical and legal standards for informed consent, and identifying three
primary models for obtaining consent in the context of human tissue research.
Part II explores recent findings on the psychology of decision making in the
consumer context, and Part III applies these findings to tiered consent for
human tissue research. The article concludes by identifying areas for future
research and highlighting the critical role that law and policy, enriched with an
understanding of decision-making psychology, must play in shaping the future
of human tissue research.

I. THE THEORY AND
LAW OF INFORMED CONSENT
A. Why Consent Matters to the Research Use
of Human Tissues
The right to decide whether and how one's body and its parts may be used
in research has been described as a "fundamental" right,9 although courts have
yet to recognize such strong protection for providers of human tissue for research. Respect for the interest of tissue providers in controlling the ways in
which their tissues, and the information contained in their cells, are used flows
in part from respect for human dignity. Human dignity demands that all persons be treated not merely as means to an end, but also as ends in themselves. 1O When individuals are made tissue providers without their knowledge
and authorization, they may suffer the harm of physical invasion and deprivation of their "autonomous right to be let alone.,,11 When individuals are not
adequately equipped with information pertinent to their decision about
whether or not to participate in a course of action, be it medical treatment,
direct participation in research, or the provision of tissue for research, they
suffer a dignitary harm by being deprived of their "autonomous right to
choose.,,12
Concern for tissue providers' interest in control is not merely academic.
Many people invest every use of their body, or pieces of it, with moral and
ethical significance. 13 Orthodox Jews, for example, often hold religious beliefs
9. Robert M. Sade, Research on Stored Biological Samples Is Still Research, 162 ARCHNES
INTERNAL MED. 1439, 1440 (2002).
10. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 (Mary Gregor
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785); see also Sade, supra note 9, at 1440 (arguing that
tissue providers should be referred to as "research subjects" rather than as "sources" because the
latter term "suggest[s] that [tissue providers] are things rather than willing persons").
II. Maryjoy Ballantyne, One Man's Trash Is Another Man's Treasure: Increasing Patient
Autonomy Through a Limited Self-Intellectual Propeny Right, 3 GEO. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 567, 576
(2005).
12.Id.
13. Cf Margaret Jane Radin, Propeny and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 966 (1982)
(describing "the body" as "quintessentially personal property because it is literally constitutive of
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that the body must be buried whole; indeed, "if a person's leg is amputated
during his or her life, arrangements are made to store that body part for burial
with the individual after death.,,14 Many Native Americans hold similar beliefs
about the integrity of the body.15 Limitations short of absolute refusal to the
research use of tissues may also arise:
[Sjome people may wish to limit the use of their samples to noncommercial
entities. Others may wish to forbid the use of their samples to investigate
certain disorders, particularly if the disorders are stigmatizing for a specific
population group, such as an alcoholism gene might be. In addition, retaining
tissue samples or immortalizing cell lines may violate cultural or religious
beliefs. 16

Thus, informed consent-really, informed choice-plays a critical role in
protecting tissue providers' interest in control. As such, informed consent is
fundamentally an expression of respect for human dignity: ''To say that one
cannot be bound by a promise that one did not voluntarily and knowingly
make is to say that the individual should be the author of her own undertakings, that a genuine respect for her dignity requires a broad deference to her
choices.,,17
Yet, respect for the tissue provider's interest in control, and therefore a
requirement for informed consent, emerges not only from considerations of
respect for human dignity, but also from more consequentialist considerations
about maximizing the amount of tissue available for research. Individuals may
refuse to provide tissue for research if they fear that their interest in controlling
the future uses of their cells and genetic information will not be respected.
More troubling still is the possibility that concerns about the future use of cells
obtained during routine medical care may cause individuals to forego such
care. This has been reported anecdotally among African American women,
who, recalling past abuses in medical interventions and research involving
African Americans such as "the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiment and
the chaotic conditions attending early sickle-cell anemia carrier trait screen-

one's personhood"). Radin observes that "bodily parts may be too 'personal' to be property at all."
Id. Nevertheless, she recognizes that "[i]f the body is property, then objectively it is property for
personhood," and she links this understanding of the body to the tort of battery. Id.
14. Lori B. Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 25

(2005).
IS. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 49; see also Larry Rohter, In the
AlTUlzon, Giving Blood but Getting Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,2007, at AI, C"A soul can only
be at rest after the entire body is cremated,' said Davi Yanomami, a leader of the [Yanomami tribe
in the Amazon of Brazil]. To have the blood of a dead person preserved and separated from the
remainder of the body is simply unacceptable to us. "').
16. Clayton et aI., supra note 8, at 1788.
17. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900 (1994); see also
Allen Buchanan, An Ethical Framework for Biological Samples Policy, in 2 NAT'L BIOETHICS
ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at B-1, B-16 ("Informed consent is primarily a protect [sic]
against nonconsensual bodily invasions and against dignatory [sic] harms that can generally be
ranked under the category of treating persons disrespectfully, as if they were mere means for the
pursuit of others' ends.").
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ing,,,'8 have refused prenatal diagnosis out of fear about other uses that might
be made of their amniotic tissue. 19 Thus, respect for informed consent has both
a deontological and a utilitarian basis.
Moreover, a tissue provider's interest in control over the use of her tissue
in research embraces a number of important derivative interests, including
interests in confidentiality and commercialization. A tissue provider'S interest
in confidentiality is both an instrumental and fundamental privacy interest in
protecting the provider from the negative impact of unwanted disclosure of
information about the provider that is discovered through research. If third
parties such as insurance providers or employers gain access to this information, individuals may be denied health or life insurance covera§e, or they may
lose their jobs on account of anticipated health problems. 0 Unrequested
disclosure of information to the tissue provider or her family may also cause
distress or embarrassment. 21 These concerns pertain primarily to research

18. Rayna Rapp, Refusing Prenatal Diagnosis: The Meanings of Bioscience in a
Multicultural World, 23 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 45, 49 (1998).
19. Dorothy Nelkin & Lori B. Andrews, Introduction: The Body, Economic Power and
Social Control, 75 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 3, 7 (1999) (citing Rapp, supra note 18); see also Donna T.
Chen et al., Research with Stored Biological Samples: What Do Research Participants Want?, 165
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 652 (2005) (reporting an empirical study showing that, given the
option to permit all future research use of their tissues, African Americans were less likely than
whites to provide this unlimited authorization).
20. Ted T. Ashburn et aI., Human Tissue Research in the Genomic Era of Medicine:
Balancing Individual and Societal Interests, 160 ARCHNES INTERNAL MED. 3377, 3378 (2000)
(noting that "there have been many documented cases of insurance and employment
discrimination based on an individual's genetic makeup"); see also DOROTHY NELKIN &
LAURENCE TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS: THE SOCIAL POWER OF BIOLOGICAL
INFORMATION 4, 7 (1989); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, President Calls for Genetic Privacy Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18,2007, at AI4 (reporting on President Bush's urging to Congress to pass a genetic
privacy bill because "[ilf a person is willing to share his or her genetic information, it is important
that that information not be exploited in improper ways" and "[wle want medical research to go
forward without an individual fearing personal discrimination"). The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act promises to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of genetic
information in employment and health insurance. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008). This is an encouraging sign, although it is
unclear how the Act will operate in practice.
21. See Stewart A. Laidlaw et aI., Genetic Testing and Human Subjects in Research, 24
WHmIER L. REv. 454, 460 (2002) ("Emotional or psychological harms from learning one is a
carrier of a genetic disease can be devastating. This is particularly true when the onset of the
disease is a virtual certainty, such as in the case of Huntington's disease."); see also Sonia M.
Suter, Note, Whose Genes Are These Anyway? Familial Conflicts over Access to Genetic
Infonnation, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1854, 1860 (1993) ("Genetic data are also unique in how they may
affect self-identity. Empirical evidence shows that the knowledge or assumption that one carries
certain disease genes can affect self-perception." (citation omitted». If genetic analysis in research
exposes mismatched paternity, this is likely to be stressful to existing family relationships as well
as embarrassing to all parties involved. See Susan M. Denbo, What Your Genes Know Affects
Them: Should Patient Confidentiality Prevent Disclosure of Genetic Test Results to a Patient's
Biological Relatives?, 43 AM. Bus. LJ. 561,598 & n.l62 (2006) (noting that "the revelation of
genetic test results to family members may cause a special type of harm, one that some
commentators have labeled the 'family secrets' problem").
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involving genetic analysis, as genetic information can serve as a basis for
predictive diagnosis of future medical conditions or health risks?2
The interests that tissue providers advance concerning the commercialization of products derived from their cells tend to follow one of two lines. One
line contends that the commercialization of body products is wholly unethical.
This focal point arises because some individuals have moral, ethical, or religious objections to the commercialization of pieces of the human body23 or
concerns about the coercion and exploitation of those providing tissue. 24 Alternatively, tissue providers may argue that those who provide the raw materials
of research should share in the economic benefits of the fruits of that provision.
Thus, tissue providers advance a number of strong claims, both
deontological and instrumental, for why their preferences and choices should
matter in research involving human tissue. Respect for provider consent therefore plays an essential role in creating a legal framework in which ethical
research can take place.

B. What Consent Requires
Accepting that consent remains vital in the context of human tissue research, the question then becomes what consent requires. In a classic treatise
on consent, Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp identified five necessary elements of consent: disclosure; understanding; voluntariness; decision-making

22. See, e.g., NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 19-20 (describing the
value of human tissue to cancer research); Francis S. Collins et aI., A Vision for the Future of
Genomics Research, 422 NATURE 835, 835, 841 (2003) (describing the promise of the Human
Genome Project, including "[c]linical opportunities for gene-based pre-symptomatic prediction of
illness," and identifying a "Grand Challenge": to "[d]evelop genome-based approaches to
prediction of disease susceptibility and drug response, early detection of illness, and molecular
taxonomy of disease states").
23. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 49 ("Some individuals may
object to the possibility that researchers could sell their samples to companies for profit.");
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
24. See, e.g., Testimony on Egg Retrieval to California Senate Committee, Joint Oversight
Hearing on the Implementation of Proposition 71, the Stem Cell Research and Cures Act: Joint
Hearing Before the California Senate Subcommittee on Stem Cell Research Oversight, Senate
Health Committee, and Assembly Health Committee, 2005 Leg. (Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of
Francine Coeytaux, MPH, Pro-Choice Alliance for Responsible Research), available at http://
geneticsandsociety.orglarticle.php?id= 180 (noting that so long as financial inducement is available, most human eggs obtained for human cloning research will come from poor women); Donna
Dickenson, Commodification of Human Tissue: Implications for Feminist and Development
Ethics, 2 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 55, 55-56 (2002) (arguing that human eggs required for
cloning research are likely to come from women in the southern hemisphere and to support research in the northern hemisphere and available only to those in the North). In many of these
instances, those who bear the burden of producing tissue for research may not be the ones who
enjoy the benefits flowing from research.
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capacity or competence; and authorization. 25 Each of these facets of consent
imposes duties on practicing medical professionals and research scientists.
Disclosure requires professionals to impart necessary and material information
to patients and research subjects. 26 Much emphasis and academic and professional literature focuses on the disclosure aspect of consent. 27 Indeed, the
emphasis on disclosure is evident even in the term of art "informed consent,"
which stresses the availability of information.
Despite less focus in the relevant literature, the other four aspects of consent are also critical. Understanding requires that professionals ensure that
information is intelligible to nonmedical experts and that individual patients
have understood the information disclosed to them. 28 Like disclosure, understanding is crucial to ensuring that consent is "informed."29 Voluntariness
demands that consent be freely given. 3o Excessive physical, mental, or even
financial inducements to consent are unethical and vitiate consent because the
notion of consent is meaningless where no true option of refusal exists.
Decision-making capacity informs the elements of understanding and voluntariness by requiring that patients or research participants (or their legal representatives) be competent to understand and make decisions?) Competence is
necessary to ensure that vulnerable persons are not exploited and that those
providing consent are legally and ethically capable of doing SO.32 Finally,
although the word "authorization" lends itself to the affirmative decision to
proceed, it is meant to signify that the individual in question must make an

25. RUTIi R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 274 (1986). Faden and Beauchamp initially identify the second element of informed
consent as "comprehension," but they later use the language of "understanding." [d. at 298-336.
Additionally, Faden and Beauchamp name the fifth component simply "consent." They rightly
note, however, that the locution applied to this element is contested. [d. at 274-75. They later
deploy "authorization" in describing informed consent as "a specific kind of autonomous choice."
[d. at 277. This article uses the term "authorization" to align its understanding of consent with this
model of autonomous authorization, id. at 277-80, and to acknowledge that not all informed
consent interactions will, in fact, result in consent to participation. See also infra text
accompanying note 33.
26. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 308.
27. See id. at 275-76. The Supreme Court has likewise defined informed consent solely in
terms of disclosure. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976)
("One might well wonder ... just what 'informed consent' of a patient is .... [W]e are content to
accept, as the meaning, the giving of information to the patient as to just what would be done and
as to its consequences. ").
28. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 314-19, 326-29. Faden and Beauchamp
identify understanding as one of the three core conditions of autonomy. [d. at 248-55. They later
devote an entire chapter of their book to the role of understanding for informed consent. [d. at
298-336.
29. [d. at 305.
30. [d. at 337. Like understanding, Faden and Beauchamp identify voluntariness as a core
condition of autonomy. [d. at 256-62. The relationship between voluntariness, autonomy, and
informed consent is more fully addressed in a later chapter of their book. [d. at 337-81.
31. [d. at 287-93.
32. [d.
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affIrmative decision either to proceed with or to refuse a proposed medical or
research intervention. 33
These fIve ~rinciples of consent underlie and animate legal doctrines of
consent as well. Where consent is inadequate or incomplete, patients and research participants have successfully brought tort claims arising under battery
and negligence. 35 Competency is critical to legal claims regarding consent, as
minors and incompetent persons are generally legally unable to provide valid
consent. 36 Medical professionals who perform procedures without authorization from patient-participants may face claims of battery.37 Likewise, where
consent has been coerced, tort doctrine dictates that such consent is invalid and
a battery has occurred. 38 Medical professionals who do not adequately disclose
material risks may also be subject to tort liability under negligence. 39 The
scope of required disclosures has oscillated between two primary standards:
33. Id. at 278.
34. Faden and Beauchamp posit that it is "morally axiomatic that [infonned consent as
autonomous authorization] ought to serve-and in fact ha[s] served-as the benchmark: or model
against which the moral adequacy of a definition framed for [infonned consent as effective
consent] is to be evaluated." Id. at 284.
35. See, e.g., Bryson v. Stone, 190 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Stover v. Ass'n of
Thoracic & Cardiovascular Surgeons, 635 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
36. See, e.g., FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 36 (defining a "incompetent person"
as "one who ... is unable to give an infonned consent," and noting that "[m]inors ... are
presumed incompetent in law, whereas adults can generally be declared legally incompetent only
on the basis of some 'factual' determination"); GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 371 (3d ed. 2007) (observing that some individuals are deemed
incompetent because they "lack specific or general capacities" and are "in need of a guardian to
make decisions for them," while others, such as minors, are "de jure incompetent for most
purposes"). For federal regulations governing the inclusion of children as subjects of research, see
45 C.F.R. § 46 Subpart D (2007).
37. See, e.g., Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 1958) (,,[W]here
a physician or surgeon can ascertain in advance of an operation alternative situations and no
immediate emergency exists, a patient should be infonned of the alternative possibilities and given
a chance to decide before the doctor proceeds with the operation."); Isaac v. Jameson Mem'l
Hosp., 932 A.2d 924, 929 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) ("A claim of a lack of infonned consent sounds in
the intentional tort of battery because an operation perfonned without the patient's consent is
deemed to be the equivalent to a technical assault."). The most widely cited fonnulation of
infonned consent comes from an early-twentieth century opinion considering a battery claim. In
Schloendorffv. Society of the New York Hospital, Justice Cardozo stated, "Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to detennine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he
is liable in damages." 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig,
143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
38. JAMES F. DRANE, CLINICAL BIOETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN MEDICAL-ETHICAL
DECISION MAKING 127 (1994).
39. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Natanson v. Kline, 350
P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960); FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 28-30 (describing the
negligence theory of liability in infonned consent doctrine). Although physicians may be liable for
failure to disclose under negligence, it is often difficult for plaintiff-patients to make the requisite
showings to carry their claim, particularly with respect to causation. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil
B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Tons: The Myth of Justiciable Causation,
1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607. Thus, we should pause before concluding that infonned consent must be
and is collected before every specific intervention-the actual practice of medicine may leave us
disappointed.
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the professional practice standard and the reasonable person standard. 40
Natanson v. Kline, an early and influential account of the professional practice
standard, held that "[t]he duty of the physician to disclose ... is limited to
those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under
the same or similar circumstances.,,41 Later, in Canterbury v. Spence, a classic
case addressing the duty to disclose, the court described "true consent" as
what happens to one's self in the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the
risks attendant upon each. The average patient has little or no understanding
of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can
look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision. From
these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and in tum the requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to make such a
42
decision possible.

Under Canterbury, physicians have a general legal duty to disclose all material
risks-material risks being those that "a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to
attach significance to . . . in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed
therapy.,,43 Despite Canterbury's prominence, the professional practice standard has remained the majority rule. 44 Nevertheless, both standards take as
their starting point the physician's duty to disclose to her patients information
necessary to make an informed decision whether to proceed. 45 In this fashion,
legal doctrine has attempted to incorporate ethical principles governing consent.
Similarly, federal regulations governing human subjects research have
also been structured around the ethical principles of informed consent. 46 In the

40. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 30-33. Faden and Beauchamp also identify a
third standard, governed by the subjective needs of an individual patient, but they rightly note that
this standard has not gained much traction in legal doctrine. Id. at 30, 33-34.
41. 350 P .2d at 11 06.
42. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (footnotes omitted).
43.464 F.2d at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Infonned Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970».
44. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 25, at 31; see also id. at 32 (observing that many state
courts declined to adopt the Canterbury standard, and that some states that did adopt Canterbury's
rule have subsequently adopted the professional practice standard by statute). See generally
Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Modem Status of Views as to General Measure of Physician's
Duty To Infonn Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R.3d 1008 (originally published
1978).
45. See Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1104 ("'A physician violates his duty to his patient and
subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.'" (quoting Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957».
46. The modem legal baseline for informed consent for participation in human subject
research emanates from the Nuremburg Code. Pennissible Medical Experiments, in 2 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949). Today, human subject research is often governed by statute at the
state and federal level.
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United States, research involving human sUbjects conducted using federal
monies must comply with the Common Rule. 7 The Common Rule requires
researchers to provide potential research participants with extensive information in the course of obtaining informed consent, including information about
the expected risks and benefits of the research and confidentiality procedures
to be followed, as well as assurance that participation is optional and may be
withdrawn at any time. 48 The FDA imposes similar requirements for all studies
submitted for its review. 49 Together, these two federal standards govern the
vast majority of human subjects research conducted in the United States.
To date, agencies and courts have been hesitant to impose these consent
requirements on researchers obtaining human tissue for use in research, and
human tissue research has therefore become a particularly thorny problem for
traditional formulations of informed consent. In 2004, the federal Office of
Human Research Protections issued a guidance document stating that "tissue
collection for present or future research purposes is not subject to the IRB
review and informed consent provisions of the Common Rule, as long as there
is no personally identifiable information attached to the tissue specimens."so In
2006, the FDA followed suit. S1 In the famous Moore case, the California
Supreme Court hinged John Moore's ability to lodge a claim of lack of informed consent to the research and commercial use of his cells on the fact that
his physician was acting in the role of both physician and researcher. s2 However, whether researchers interacting with tissue providers in a purely research
relationship legally owe any similar duty of care is less obvious. In Greenberg
v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, Inc., for instance, the district
court stated, "[t]here is no automatic fiduciary relationship that attaches when
a researcher accepts medical donations and the acceptance of trust, the second
constitutive element of finding a fiduciary duty, cannot be assumed once a
donation is given."s3 The court in Greenberg held that the duty of informed
consent could not be extended to require disclosure of a researcher's commer-

47.45 C.F.R. § 46.101-.409 (2007).
48. § 46.116(a)-(b). In some instances, these requirements for informed consent may be
waived, as where research poses only "minimal risk" to participants. § 46.116(d); see also §
46.116(c) (setting forth additional circumstances under which the requirements for informed
consent may be waived).
49. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56, 812 (2007).
50. M. B. Kapp, Ethical and Legal Issues in Research Involving Human Subjects: Do You
Want a Piece of Me?, 59 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 335,336 (2006).
51. 71 Fed. Reg. 1429, 1430 (Jan. 9, 2006) (providing notice that the "FDA intends to
exercise enforcement discretion when ... [t]he study uses leftover specimens[,] ... [t]he specimens are not individually identifiable[,] [t]he specimens are provided to the investigator(s) without
identifiers[,] ... [t]he individuals caring for the patients are different from ... those conducting
the investigation[,] and the study has been reviewed by an IRB [institutional review board]").
52. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
53. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072
(S.D. Fla. 2003). But see Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001)
(holding that "under certain circumstances, [informed consent agreements in nontherapeutic
research projects] can, as a matter of law, constitute 'special relationships' giving rise to duties,
out of the breach of which negligence actions may arise").
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cial interests. 54 Indeed, that court expended considerable energy in deciding
whether researchers have any duty to obtain infonned consent from tissue
providers. 55 Most recently, in Washington University v. Catalona, the Eighth
Circuit eliminated nearly all provider control over the use of tissue samples in
a university repository---despite the presence of informed consent documents
with more limited language-by giving unrestricted ownership of the samples
to Washington University, cabined only by a limited right to withdraw. 56
In large part, these decisions are motivated by concerns that demanding
consent in the context of human tissue research will be detrimental to scientific
progress. For instance, Judge Limbaugh, who presided over the Catalona
matter in the district court, declared, "[m]edical research can only advance if
access to these materials to the scientific community is not thwarted by private
agendas.,,57 Likewise, in Moore, the California Supreme Court opined that
recognizing Moore's property right in his cells would have a chilling effect on
socially beneficial medical research. 58 The FDA similarly asserted in its notice
that "the existing [consent] requirements are bringing a halt to a class of very
valuable research that can produce new diagnostic tests, without appreciably
adding protection for human subjects.,,59
Yet, as Part I.A makes clear, enabling tissue providers to exercise their
interests in the use of their cells in research is essential to the ethical and effective conduct of research. 60 The same principles that undergird infonned
consent doctrine in the contexts of medical treatment and traditional human
subjects research-including respect for autonomy and human dignity-support the need to obtain consent to the use of human tissue for medical research. 61 Moreover, instrumental interests in maximizing the amount of
research-available tissue likewise point to giving teeth to consent in the context of human tissue research. Ultimately, both the interests of tissue providers
and the interests of researchers must be accorded adequate respect and protection. If either set of interests is not properly attended to, the interests of both-

54. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-71.
55.Id. at 1068-70. The court concluded that "in certain circumstances a medical researcher
does have a duty of informed consent," but it did not specify how one can identify when a duty
does or does not attach. /d. at 1070.
56. Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007), cerr. denied, 128 S. Cl
1122 (2008).
57. Washington Univ. v. CataIona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2006), affd, 490
F.3d 667, cen. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008).
58. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (,The second
important policy consideration is that we not threaten with disabling civil liability innocent parties
who are engaged in socially useful activities, such as researchers who have no reason to believe
that their use of a particular cell sample is, or may be, against a donor's wishes.").
59.71 Fed. Reg. 1429 (Jan. 9, 2006).
60. See supra Part I.A.
61. See supra Part II.A; see also Russell Korobkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent in
Nontherapeutic Biomedical Research, 54 UCLA L. REV. 605 (2007) (arguing that considerations
of autonomy requires informed consent to the use of human tissue in medical research).
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as well as the interests of society at large-will be thwarted. 62 Thus, policies
regulating consent in the context of human tissue research must attempt to
square ethics with practical and legal realities.

C. Models of Informed Consent for Human Tissue Research
In moving forward with human tissue research, three basic models of
consent have developed. First, blanket consent may be obtained, in which
potential tissue providers are asked to consent to all possible future research
uses of their tissue. This model of consent is often preferred by administrators
and regulators, as it imposes the fewest administrative burdens. For example,
following the royal assent of Canada's Assisted Human Reproduction Act,63
Health Canada, the body responsible for promulgating regulations pursuant to
the Act, announced that it would require only blanket consent for individuals
providing gametes for third-party assisted reproduction in Canada--once gametes are designated for third-party use, they come under the control of the
gamete recipients, who may decide at a later date to allocate embryos created
from those gametes to research purposes. 64 Blanket consent for research is also
often obtained from patients at routine medical appointments. In many cases,
physicians or hospitals use admission forms containing language such as "I
give my doctor permission to dispose of my tissues or use them in research.,,65
Many ethicists and legal scholars have rejected blanket consent models on
grounds that they do not even approach true informed consent. 66 After all,
human tissue research encompasses a broad range of activities, and tissue
providers who wish to contribute to some research projects may not want to
participate in others. Blanket consent therefore demands consent that cannot
be fully informed, and it may oblige consent to research that some individuals
may find morally objectionable. 67 As a general model of consent, blanket
consent is impermissibly overbroad.
At the other end of the spectrum is project-specific consent, under which
tissue providers are contacted before each use of their tissues for research in
order to provide the opportunity for consent. Project-specific consent best

62. See Ashburn et aI., supra note 20, at 3381 (noting that failing to mediate tensions between donors and researchers "may dissuade patients from participating in medical research
studies and slow progress in medical research").
63. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2004 S.c., ch. 2 (Can.).
64. See Assisted Human Reproduction Section 8 Regulations, 139 C. Gaz. (Pt. 0 § 13(d)
(Sept. 24, 2005); see also Ram, supra note 5 (critiquing Health Canada's then-proposed regulations).
65. Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 16.2006, at 38. The
appropriateness of obtaining such consent in a general admission form (that many patients do not
read) is debatable at best. However, given that Skloot reports that some physicians do not obtain
even this limited consent, id., some appreciation may be due to those physicians that make the
limited effort to attempt to obtain consent of any kind for tissue donation.
66. See, e.g., Clayton et aI., supra note 8; Ram, supra note 5, at 23; Sade, supra note 9, at
1439. It is also worth noting that some authors have observed that blanket consent also does not
meet the legal requirements of the Common Rule or HIPAA. See, e.g., Wendler, supra note 8.
67. Ram, supra note 5, at 23.
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approaches the paradigm of informed consent, as it makes available to tissue
providers the most precise information for a given consent interaction. Because tissue providers consent to one research project at a time, they are necessarily more informed about the specific research projects in which their tissues
are used. Nevertheless, although theoretically possible, project-specific consent has not been commonly used in the context of human tissue research
because of its administrative burdens to researchers (for example, maintaining
accurate phone or mail records and tracking tissue providers and their consent
decisions)68 and psychological burdens to tissue providers (continued
confrontation with consent interactions can be stressful and bothersome for
providers, especially when tissue was obtained in the course of treatment for
illness).69
Straddling the midpoint between blanket and project-specific consent is
tiered consent, which attempts to preserve the benefits of blanket and projectspecific consent models while minimizing their disadvantages. Tiered consent
allows research participants to choose from a number of options, but does not
oblige tissue providers to consent to any, some, or all categories of research.
Furthermore, because tiered consent often includes an option for recontact to
obtain project-specific consent, tiered consent strengthens the ability of potential tissue providers to make their wishes known. In this respect, tiered consent
protects consent as both freely given and informed. 7o
At the same time, tiered consent may minimize the administrative burdens
associated with project-specific consent processes by standardizing the range
of research categories to which tissue providers may consent and obtaining
this consent upfront, rather than continually as research projects arise. Tiered
consent thus assuages many of the concerns identified by courts and regulators
declining to impose consent requirements on those obtaining tissue for research purposes. 71
Yet, in attempting to ensure adequate provider choice while limiting
administrative and researcher burdens, tiered consent is also a process constantly in tension. The ethical (and sometimes legal) demands of true informed
consent exert pressure towards continually expanding menus of research categories to which potential tissue providers may consent. More research options,
each of which embraces a narrower range of research projects, would seem to
increase the probability that a given tissue provider truly understands and
68. See P.N. Furness & M.L. Nicholson, Obtaining Explicit Consent for the Use of Archival
Tissue Samples: Practicallssues, 301. MED. ETHICS 561, 561 (2004).
69. See PEOPLE SCI. & POL'y LTD., BIOBANK UK: A QUESTION OF TRUST: A
CONSULTATION ExpWRlNG AND ADDRESSING QUESTIONS OF PuBLIC TRUST I, 12 (2002),
hnp:llwww.ukbiobank.ac.ukI docs/consultation. pdf.
70. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 65. The legal status of tiered
consent is not uncontroversial. For instance, although the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission recommended tiered consent for obtaining consent to future use of tissues in research, some commissioners expressed concerns that tiered consent may not meet legal thresholds
for disclosure. ld. To date, 1 am not aware of any complete and rigorous analysis of the legal status
of tiered consent.
71. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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shares in the nature and goals of the research to which she is consenting. Insofar as autonomy, understood in rational choice terms, is a guidepost to informed consent theory and doctrine, proliferation of tiered consent options is
likely to be demanded. Tiered consent thus represents a delicate balance between the competing but interdependent interests of tissue providers on the
one hand (who might otherwise demand more information and more research
categories among which to choose) and the interests of researchers on the
other hand (who might otherwise desire fewer restrictions on access to tissues).72
Tiered consent is most frequently encountered in cancer research, where
tumor tissue plays a key role in understanding how cancer develops and progresses and in developing new treatments. 73 Patients undergoing biopsy or surgery are routinely asked to provide their excised tissues for research purposes. 74 Consent for such provision often takes the form of tiered consent
presenting three options:
1. My tissue may be kept for use in research to learn about, prevent, or treat
cancer.
2. My tissue may be kept for use in research to learn about, prevent or treat
other health problems (e.g., diabetes, Alzheimer's disease, or heart
disease).
3. Someone from xyz may contact me in the future to ask me to take part in
75
more research.

However, in a recent report that displays the tensions seemingly inherent
in formulating tiered consent processes, the Tissue Access Working Group of
the National Dialogue on Cancer Research has questioned whether this consent model "go[es] far enough" in protecting patient choice. 76 The Working
72. In this sense, one might view tiered consent as analogous to intellectual property rights
like copyright, which also seek to maintain a "delicate balance" between two interdependent and
competing groups of interests in free expression. See David Nimmer et aI., The Metamorphosis of
Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17, 22 n.9 (1999) (describing the widespread metaphor of
copyright as a "delicate balance").
73. Nat'l Cancer Inst. & Nat'l Action Plan on Breast Cancer, Model Consent Form for Use
of Tissue for Research, http://www.cancerdiagnosis.nci.nih.gov/specimenslmodel.pdf (last visited
Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Model Consent] (setting forth the model informed consent document
for the National Cancer Institute); Nat'l Cancer Inst. & Nat'l Action Plan on Breast Cancer,
Patient Information Sheet, http://www.cancerdiagnosis.nci.nih.gov/specimenslpatient.pdf (last
visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Patient Information Sheet]. The importance of human tissue in
cancer research was a key point in the recent Catalona litigation. See Brief for Am. Cancer Soc'y
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 3, Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th
Cir. 2(07) (Nos. 06-2286 & 06-2301) ("Research using biological materials stored in
biorepositories is an indispensable tool in the national effort to discover new ways to detect,
prevent, and treat cancer and other diseases.").
74. See Brief for Am. Cancer Soc'y as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee, supra
note 73, at 8 ("It is common, for example, for cancer patients undergoing biopsy or surgery
involving removal of malignant or benign tissue to consent to a small amount of the tissue being
stored for later research."); Patient Information Sheet, supra note 73.
75. Model Consent, supra note 73.
76. Univ. of S. Me. Bioethics Project, What Is Tiered Consent? (Dec. 27, 2005),
http://www.usm.maine.edulbioethicslbiobanklethicaUicltiered.html.
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Group identified several additional parameters along which patient-provider
choice could be expanded, including type of sample, type of research (parsed
more finely than in the current form), type of specimen to be provided, type of
researcher, duration of storage time, and type of products, if any, to be derived
from the tissue. 77
Proposals for tiered consent for other types of research have also appeared. For example, I have proposed elsewhere a model for tiered consent for
individuals providing gametes for third-party use that would preserve the ability of such providers to control whether embryos created using their gametes
would be eligible for research use and, if so, for what kinds of embryo research.78 Drawing on categories of embryo research identified in British
legislation, this model for tiered consent suggested at least eight potential
research categories. More generally, the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission has also advocated the adoption of tiered consent processes for
human tissue research, although no precise number of research categories was
identified. 79
As research progresses and expands, the number of substantively and
ethically diverse uses for human tissue in research likewise expands. Human
embryos may be used to develop more efficient techniques of in vitro fertilization, or safer abortifacients, or embryonic stem cell lines that may serve as
the substrate for research wholly unrelated to reproduction. The same is true
for other kinds of tissue research--cancer tissue, for instance, may now be
cultivated into stem cell lines that can be directed toward a host of research
projects beyond anything contemplated even in the recent past. And human
skin cells may now be reprogrammed to become pluripotent stem cells-a feat
most of us knew nothing about even a few months ago. 80 As noted above, if
consent is to be truly informed, this would seem to demand that the number of
research categories in tiered consent processes must also expand. The Tissue
Access Working Group's proposal for expanded choice in tiered consent processes for research use of cancer tissue is real world evidence of the concern
that expanding avenues of research requires expanding tiered consent menus.
Yet, beyond a certain point, more choice may frustrate informed decision
making, rather than aid it. If regulations governing research and judicial doctrines imposing liability for faulty procedures are to engender processes that
permit potential research participants to make free and informed choices about
providing their tissues for research purposes, it is essential that policymakers
understand and incorporate findings about the dynamics of decision making in
constructing appropriate consent processes.

77. /d.; see also EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 134.
78. Ram, supra note 5, at 24.
79. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 64--65.
80. See Kazutoshi Takahashi et aI., Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Adult Human
Fibroblasts by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861, 861 (2007); Junying Yu et aI., Induced Pluripotent
Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Somatic Cells, 318 SCI. 1917, 1917 (2007).
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II. THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF DECISION MAKING IN SITUATIONS
OF ABUNDANT CHOICE
Traditional social science theory suggests that more choices are preferable
to fewer choices: "[T]he standard line among social scientists who study
choice [is that i]f we're rational ... added options can only make us better off
as a society.,,81 For those who seek just the "right" thing, more choices mean a
greater probability of success. 82 Alternatively, for those who do not really care
one way or another, additional choices can simply be ignored. 83
In general, this logic seems compelling. "[C]hoice improves the quality of
our lives. It enables us to control our destinies .... Choice is essential to
autonomy, which is absolutely fundamental to well-being. Healthy people
need and want to direct their own lives.,,84 This is precisely the understanding
of autonomy and liberty that undergirds the traditional doctrine of informed
consent.
Yet, social science researchers are discovering that "the fact that some
choice is good doesn't necessarily mean that more choice is better.,,85 Such
findings are antithetical to classic economic theory because this theory does
not admit to limitations in human cognition or to potential psychological
tradeoffs that must be made when many, as opposed to few, options are available. 86 Behavioral economics and decision-making psychology, meanwhile,
draw attention to precisely these tradeoffs. Indeed, researchers in these fields
have found that more choice can actually demotivate decision making and
decrease satisfaction when choices are made. 87
This Part focuses on the implications of hyperchoice for decision makers.
The Part that follows then explores what effect these implications are likely to
have in the context of informed consent using a tiered model. Current research
suggests four primary pitfalls to abundant choice: information overload; arbitrary selection; avoidance of decision making; and regret. Each of these will be
discussed in tum.

81. BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LESS 19 (2004).
82.ld.
83.ld.
84.ld. at 3; see also EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND
SELF-DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 30 (Elliot Aronson ed., 1985) (discussing research
suggesting that autonomy enhances intrinsic motivation); GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE PROGRESS
PARADOX (2003) (arguing that the standard of living in modem America far exceeds that of
almost all people throughout human history); Diane I. Cordova & Mark R. Lepper, Intrinsic
Motivation and the Process of Learning: Beneficial Effects of Contextualization, Personalization,
and Choice, 88 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 715 (1996); Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When
Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 995 (2000) (documenting several books and journal articles demonstrating that
provision of choice can be positive).
85. SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, at 3.
86. See id.
87. See infra Part II.B-C.
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A. Information Overload
Data on the effects of consumer hyperchoice and information overload
flrst surfaced in the 1970s and 1980s. 88 These studies showed that the human
mind is not of limitless capacity and that the information available for decision
making can only be of some flnite magnitude before the mind is simply overwhelmed. 89 Defining "information load" as "a mUltiplicative function of the
amount of product attributes and alternative information available for a single
decision,,,90 these researchers and their modem counterparts have identifled
two axes along which information overload can occur. First, decision makers
experience information overload when presented with an overwhelming number of options that must be considered simultaneously.91 Second, decision
makers experience information overload when presented with an overwhelmingly complex decision, even when only a few options are available, because
of the many details or attributes of each option that need to be considered.92
Most research on the constraints of information load has focused on the former
problem, and most of this research has focused on decision making by consumers in market settings.
When individuals experience information overload, research suggests that
they adopt a variety of methods for simplifying the decision-making process. 93
For instance, decision makers adopt "simplifying rules,,94 or rely on "simple
heuristics,,,95 discarding or ignoring a great deal of available information and
focusing instead on a manageable subset of characteristics-in other words,
they essentialize. This behavior has been shown to lead to lower quality decision making in situations where there were clearly superior options given the
benefits available for the price charged. 96 Alternatively, some studies have
suggested that as the number of options and the information about those options increases, decision makers often consider only a small subset of the total
choices available. 97 This means that decision makers exclude a broad range of

88. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality: Some Contested Issues,
14 J. MARKETING RES. 569 (1977) (acknowledging the existence of infonnation overload and
discussing empirical and methodological mechanisms for measuring it); Naresh K. Malhotra,
Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER REs. 419, 427 (1982) (discussing the "dysfunctional effects of infonnation overload"); William M. Wilkie, Analysis of
Effects of Information Load, 11 1. MARKETING RES. 462 (1974) (arguing that the manner in which
brand infonnation is combined has an effect on the manner in which consumers interpret it).
89. Jacoby, supra note 88, at 571-72.
90. David Glen Mick et aI., Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose:
Emerging and Prospective Research on the Deleterious Effects of Living in Consumer
Hyperchoice, 52 J. Bus. ETHICS 207, 208 (2004).
91. Id.
92.Id.
93. See id. at 209.
94.Id.
95. Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 84, at 996.
96. Mick et aI., supra note 90, at 208.
97. John R. Hauser & Birger WemerfeIt, An Evaluation Cost Model of Consideration Sets,
16 J. CONSUMER REs. 393, 404--{)5 (1990).
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options without really evaluating them, once again an outcome likely to lead to
lower quality decision making.
Notwithstanding these data, some scholars have advanced the view that
the use of heuristics can, in some situations, lead to more accurate decision
making. 98 Among the most well known of these fast and frugal decisionmaking techniques is the Take the Best heuristic. Take the Best, when modeled on a computer, is used to arrive at an answer simply and easily. Even
where multiple types of relevant information to decision making are provided,
a system running Take the Best will consider only one criterion of information
at a time-starting with the criterion with the highest validity, or relative frequency with which the given criterion will identify the right answer.99 If, based
on that single factor alone, one possible answer is indicated, this answer will
be adopted, and the remaining criteria will never be considered. If the initial
factor does not make an answer plain, the criteria with the next highest validity
will be tested-alone-and so on, until an answer is indicated. loo The key to
Take the Best is that each criterion of information is tried independently; information learned from one criterion is not retained when the next criterion is
tested. Take the Best adopts as its motto "take the best, ignore the rest.,,101 In
the real world, Take the Best might operate when, faced with massive amounts
of information, we simply ignore the vast majority of available information in
favor of focusing on one or two key and manageable criteria.
In studies comparing the accuracies of Take the Best and regression
analysis (which integrates a large amount of information in arriving at a decision) at predicting which of two cities is larger, the fast and frugal heuristic
was able to predict city size with nearly as much, and in some cases more,
accuracy than a more complicated and time consuming regression analysis. 102
In these studies, ten criteria, such as whether the city had a soccer team or a
university, were available for analysis. 103 Multiple regression analysis, which
integrated and considered all ten variables, identified the larger of two cities
with 65.7% accuracy.l04 Meanwhile, Take the Best, which considered only
three criteria, made accurate choices 65.8% of the time. 105 These data have led
some researchers to laud these heuristics as critical to human survival and far
from detrimental to functional decision making in many contexts.

98. See generally SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART (Gerd Gigerenzer et al. eds.,
1999).
99. Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox,
in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART, supra note 98, at 80.
100. Id. at 81.
IOl.ld.
102. Id. at 87-88.
103. Id. at 85.
100.ld. at 87.
105.ld.
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B. Checking Out: Of Jams and Exams
Hyperchoice conditions and the difficulties of information overload can
lead not only to essentializing, but also to efforts to "check out" of the
decision-making process altogether. Available research points to two ways in
which individuals experiencing information overload attempt to escape decision making. In some cases, where the number of available choices is so great
as to be "truly daunting," rather than trying to choose, ~eople may disengage,
choosing almost arbitrarily to complete the process.,,1 In other cases, where
individuals have an option not to participate in decision making at all, they
will do so, opting instead for the status quo. In a third, distinct pattern, research suggests that sequential decision making is psychologically fatiguing
and that later-made decisions are likely to be more arbitrary or oriented towards the status quo. 107
Opting out has been demonstrated recently in a series of studies involving
the purchase of exotic jams in a grocery store and the successful completion of
an extra-credit assignment by college students in an introductory social psychology course. 108 In the fIrst study, shoppers at an upscale grocery store encountered booths offering free sampling of Wilkin and Sons jams. 109 The
booths varied in whether they offered six jams for tasting (the limited choice
condition) or twenty-four (the extensive choice condition). I 10 Each participant
could sample as many of the available jams as desired. Following tasting, each
participant was given a coupon to save one dollar on the purchase of a Wilkin
and Sons jam. III Shoppers interested in purchasing jams did so from the regular jam aisle, where they encountered all available varieties ,of Wilkin and
Sons jams (as well as jams from other brands).ll2 The results were startling.
Although more people initially approached the extensive choice booth to participate in sampling of jams (sixty percent of those who passed the extensive
choice booth stopped, while only forty percent of passing shoppers stopped at
the limited choice booth; X2 (1, N = 502) = 19.89, p < 0.001), far more individuals who had visited the limited choice booth subsequently purchased jams
(thirty percent of limited choice participants versus only three percent of extensive choice samplers; X2 (1, N = 249) = 32.34, p < 0.0001).113 The researchers concluded that although extensive options may at fust appear more
appealing than a limited array of options, "having 'too much' choice seems
nonetheless to have hampered [participants'] later motivation to buy.,,114 In

106. Barry Schwartz et ai., Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice,
83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178, 1179 (2002) (emphasis added).
107. Mick et ai., supra note 90.
108. Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 84.
109. [d. at 997.

110.ld.
IIl.ld.
112.ld.

113.ld.
114.ld.
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others words, when faced with choosing among a larger number of options,
more individuals opted simply to make no selection at all.
In the second study, students in an introductory social psychology class
were presented with the opportunity to submit a two-page essay as an extracredit assignment. 115 Student sections were provided with either a list of six
potential essay topics (the limited choice condition) or a list of thirty topics
from which to choose (the extensive choice condition)!16 The results again
were striking. Students with the limited choice list were more likely not only
to submit extra-credit essays than students faced with the extensive choice list
(seventy-four versus sixty percent completion; X2 (I, N = 193) = 3.93, p <
0.05), but also to perform slightly, but significantly, better on those essays than
extensive choice students (graded on a ten-point scale, limited choice writers
scored on average 8.09 points, while extensive choice writers scored only 7.69
points; F(I, 124) = 5.65, p < 0.02).117 Again, these results confirmed that facing "extensive options does not necessarily lead to enhanced motivation when
compared with contexts that offer a limited array of [options].,,118 Moreover,
student scores demonstrated that among active participants (that is, essay writers), individuals in limited choice settings tend to outperform those in extensive choice settings. 119 Indeed, Iyengar and Lepper reported that even where
students in the two groups selected the same essay topic, students in the extensive choice group performed worse than those in the limited choice group. 120
These studies suggest not only that individuals experiencing information
or choice overload tend to avoid decision making by opting out of active participation, but also that when they do participate they tend to do less well.
Iyengar and Lepper suggest that this second finding may result because individuals in hyperchoice situations adopt simplifying heuristics for decision
making. 121 Choice mediated through such simplifying heuristics may lead
decision makers "to feel less committed to exercising their preferences." 122
Finally, studies examining the effects of sequential decision making also
suggest that decision makers tend to opt out of making decisions when overwhelmed. 123 One study found that after making an initial difficult decision,
individuals faced with another difficult decision were more likely to opt for the

115.ld. at 998.
116.ld.
117. Id. In addition to the statistical tests conducted and reported in the study, a t-test statistic
measuring the statistical significance of differences in the mean values between two groups may
be helpful. Having conducted a t-test, the results show that the differences in average grades in
study 2 between limited choice and extensive choice participants is statistically significant (p <
0.01).
118.ld. at 999.
119.ld.
120. See id. (,The condition effect was ... significant for [overall grade), F(I, 124) = 5.65,p
< .02, with students in the limited-choice condition receiving higher grades (M = 8.09, SD = 1.05)
than those in the extensive-choice condition (M = 7.69, SD = 0.82).").
121.1d.
122.ld.
123. Mick et aI., supra note 90.

SPRING 2008

273

Ram

status quo and other risk-averse options.124 Another study documented that
after making binary choices across different product classes, participants who
had made numerous choices were significantly less able to persist at an unsolvable puzzle or to force themselves to continue drinking a distasteful beverage than the control group.125 These results strongly suggest that making
difficult decisions is strenuous and fatiguing, and that making multiple and
sequential decisions leads to declining willpower and informed decision making. 126

c. Regret
A third trend in findings on the implications of hyperchoice is that
individuals making decisions in hyperchoice settings tend to experience more
frustration in decision making and more regret afterwards. For instance, in
analyzing the extra-credit essay writing results, Iyengar and Lepper hypothesized that "choosers in extensive-choice contexts ... may feel more responsible for the choices they make because of the multitude of options available.,,127
That is, given more options, individuals may feel more pressure to find the
"best" one and are more likely to fear or experience regret once they have
made a decision. 128 Fear of regret, in tum, may cause individuals to refrain
from choosing one option among many-once again, opting out of decision
making. 129
To test whether regret or fear of regret influences decision making,
Iyengar and Lepper devised a study in which individuals were asked to select a
Godiva chocolate that they would buy for themselves based on name and appearance alone. 13o Participants were presented with either six or thirty options. 131 Participants were then given the opportunity to taste a chocolate. 132
Some groups were not given a choice about which chocolate to taste; the remaining groups were offered the chance to sample the chocolate they had
indicated previously.133 Finally, all participants were presented with two
different compensation mechanisms: either five dollars in cash or a box of
Godiva chocolates worth five dollars. 134

124. ld. at 208 (discussing a study by Jason Riis and Norbert Schwarz).
125. ld. at 208-09 (discussing Roy Baumeister & Kathleen Vohs, Willpower, Choice, and
Self· Control, in TIME AND DECISION: EcONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECfIVES ON
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 201 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003».
126. See id. at 209.
127. Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 84, at 1000.
128.ld.
129.ld.
l30.ld.
l3l.ld.
l32.ld. at 1001.
133.ld.
l34.ld.
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The results of this study showed that individuals given extensive choices
found the decision-making process to be both more enjoyable and more frustrating than individuals did in either the limited choice or no choice setting. 135
In measuring satisfaction following decision making, Iyengar and Lepper
found that participants in the extensive choice condition were significantly less
satisfied with their sampled chocolates than were participants in the limited
choice condition, although both of these groups reported higher satisfaction
that those in the no choice condition. 136
Barry Schwartz and colleagues tie regret to individuated decision-making
approaches. 137 Schwartz and colleagues posit that there are two types of decision makers: maximizers, who always seek the "best" option, and satisficers,
who generally seek a "good enough" option. 138 While having more choices
may mean that maximizers are more likely to find just the right product or to
make just the right choice, having more choices also means that there is a
greater risk of not choosing the best option. 139 If a better option later becomes
available or apparent (or perceived), maximizers are likely to experience regret. 140 Maximizers may be more likely to avoid making decisions in the first
place, to minimize the opportunity for making a "wrong" decision. Satisficers,
meanwhile, are less likely to be distressed if a better option subsequently appears because of their orientation towards "good enough" options rather than
"best" ones. 141 Therefore, satisficers are less likely to experience regret and
less likely to opt out of decision making, even when choices are abundant. 142

III. ABUNDANT CHOICE AND TIERED CONSENT
Despite the intermittent references of several authors to medical decision
making and hyperchoice,143 the vast majority of available research in this
growing field focuses on consumer psychology in which a prospective buyer
must choose one product out of a large number of similar products. In the
tiered consent context, conversely, each option represents a possible research
choice, but all, some, or none of these options may be selected simultaneously.
Thus, where the problems of hyperchoice result from an inability to accurately
weigh opportunity costs, such problems may not arise for potential tissue providers facing tiered consent because the opportunity cost of providing tissue to
option A rarely includes an inability to provide tissue to option B. This seems
most salient in considering the effects of regret on decision making. After all,
if one is concerned about the possibility that B will tum out to be better than A,
135.ld. at 1002.
136.ld. at 1003.
137. Schwartz et aI., supra note \06.
138.ld. at 1179.

139.ld.
140.ld.
141.ld.
142.ld.
143. See, e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 84, at 1004; Barry Schwartz, The Tyranny of
Choice, SCI. AM., Apr. 2004, at 70, 74.
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then the ability to select both A and B limits the possibility of missing out on
the "best" choice.
However, there are good reasons to believe that the problems experienced
in consumer hyperchoice will also manifest themselves in tiered consent hyperchoice. This Part applies the findings of consumer choice psychology identified in Part II to tiered consent, demonstrating that the difficulties of
consumer hyperchoice are likely to occur with as much or more effect in the
high stakes context of providing tissue for research as in the context of the
grocery store.

A. Information Overload
Research finding that individuals faced with information overload tend to
ignore a great deal of available information or a number of available options is
distressing for those concerned with informed decision making. Informed
consent, after all, focuses not only on disclosure of relevant information, but
also on a potential tissue provider's competency and ability to understand and
make use of that information. In the tiered consent context, if the number of
available options is overwhelming, potential tissue providers may unconsciously choose to ignore several options, depriving them of the opportunity to
provide tissue to research they may find enriching upon closer inspection.
Alternatively, potential tissue providers may attempt to choose among a vast
array of options by adopting an essentializing heuristic and thereby ignoring
swaths of relevant and important information about each option, which could
lead to truly uninformed decision making.
Tiered consent may also be a source of information overload not only
through offering too many options to be simultaneously considered, but also
by virtue of the fact that the decision to be made is likely to be a complex one.
Most tissue providers are not medically or scientifically trained, and this limits
their ability to grasp subtle nuances in scientific methodologies, to consider the
broad range of research for which they may be providing their tissues, or to
understand the tradeoffs implied in selecting one set of research options over
another. The disclosure of a vast quantity of information, even about a limited
set of available options, may therefore be a disservice to potential tissue providers, if it causes decision makers to ignore a great deal of that information
and therefore to make less informed decisions. 144
For example, in the United States, human oocytes may be donated (or
bought) for research purposes.1 45 Because oocytes are a finite resource, their
144. The same may hold true for disclosure of information in the medical treatment setting,
wherein there is strong legal incentive for physicians to disclose all available information as a
shield to liability.
145. At present, there is no federal law banning the sale or donation of human oocytes (eggs)
for research purposes, although no federal funds may be used in connection with any research on
human embryos and funding is only available for a limited number of human embryonic stem cell
lines. See President's Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research, 37 PuB. PAPERS 32 (Aug. 9,
200 I). Some states have enacted legislation that regulates assisted human reproduction and that
may govern access to donor eggs. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125350 (West 2007)
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allocation to one research use necessarily reduces the number of eggs available
for other research purposes. This is especially so with respect to embryonic
stem cell research, which is a highly inefficient process at present. l46 Thus, it
is critical that potential oocyte providers understand each option independently
so that they are best able to allocate their oocytes in accordance with their
values. Indeed, informed consent doctrines and regulations must be designed
to create processes that permit potential tissue providers to make choices according to their values-this is the core of the autonomy-human dignity norm
of informed consent. 147 In cancer research, patients providing their tissue "for
use in research to learn about, prevent or treat other health problems,,148 may
not understand just how broad a range of research projects this provision may
encompass-"other health problems" may include Alzheimer's research, but it
may also include research directed at deriving stem cell lines and learning how
to differentiate stem cells into specialized cell types.
In the context of consent, it is critical that all relevant information be
processed and integrated so that decisions are maximally informed. This must
be true for each option in a tiered consent menu. Excluding options from consideration or employing essentializing decision-making heuristics to exclude
certain data about each option undermines the purposes of tiered consent and
consent in general. Policymakers, ethicists, and researchers charged with designing informed consent processes must recognize and respond appropriately
to this kind of limitation in human cognition and understanding, so that tiered
consent processes serve, rather than undermine, the goals of informed consent.

(prohibiting the sale of human oocytes for research); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2(05)
(requiring individuals accessing assisted reproduction to enter into a written agreement for the
disposition of unwanted gametes and embryos). Moreover, the National Academies has issued
ethical guidelines for human embryonic stem cell research that recommended that gamete donors
be compensated only for expenses and not for their eggs or sperm directly. See Amy Adams,
Guidelines Issued for Embryonic Stem Cell Research, STANFORD REP., Apr. 27, 2005, at 4,
available at http://news-service.stanford.edulnewS/2005/apriI27/med-stemcell-042705.html. However, these guidelines are hortatory and do not have force of law.
146. Stem cell derivation from human embryos succeeds roughly thirty-five percent of the
time. See Lisa M. Hoffman & Melissa K. Carpenter, Characterization and Culture of Human
Embryonic Stem Cells, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 699, 700 (2005) (percentage was obtained
by averaging values reported in "percentage of ceU lines from ICMs").
Interest in human embryonic stem cell research may wane in the face of new sources of
pluripotent stem cells, see supra note 80 and accompanying text, but embryonic stem cells are
nevertheless likely to remain significant for some time to come. See Univ. of Wis.-Madison,
Scientists Guide Human Skin Cells to Embryonic State, SCIENCEDAILY, Nov. 21, 2007,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/20071111071120092709.htm ('Thomson [the head of one of
the labs that announced the derivation of pluripotent stem cells from human skin cells] notes ...
that more study of the newly-made cells is required to ensure that the 'cells do not differ from
embryonic stem cells in a clinically significant or unexpected way, so it is hardly time to
discontinue embryonic stem cell research. "').
147. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ('"True consent to
what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice 0 0. 0")'
148. Model Consent, supra note 73.
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Moreover, while the success of fast and frugal heuristics like Take the
Bese 49 might suggest that adopting heuristics does not undermine the ability of
tissue providers to make choices consistent with their values, there is good
reason to believe that the demonstrated success of these heuristics does not
correlate with usefulness in informed consent. In the first instance, it is not at
all clear that individuals have fixed preferences among different decisionmaking variables (fixed criteria validity) in the technical arena of medical
decision making,150 nor is there any objectively "right answer" when it comes
to providing tissue for research. Furthermore, the studies cited throughout Part
II indicate that hyperchoice settings are particularly ill suited for accurate
decision making by fast and frugal heuristics. Indeed, some studies have
shown that information overload and reliance on heuristics lead to lower quality decision making in situations where objectively superior options exist. 151
More specifically, research shows that lower quality decision making is especially likely to occur when the decision to be made demands emotional or
manual investment from the decision maker. 152 For example, when students
were provided with either limited or extensive numbers of choices for extra
credit essays, individuals in the limited choice setting outperformed those in
the extensive choice setting, even when students selected the same essay
topiC. 153 As Iyengar and Lepper noted, choice mediated through simplifying
heuristics may lead decision makers "to feel less committed to exercising their
preferences." 154
Providing tissue for medical research is likely to be an arena in which
decision making is, in fact, emotionally or manually demanding, especially for
certain kinds of tissues. Unlike consumer goods, in which having a stereo, for
instance, is clearly a good, tissue provision is not always so clear. For example, providing human eggs or embryos is not such an unqualified good. Some
individuals feel strongly that no human embryo research should be conducted.
Others feel that although embryo research on the causes and treatment of infertility is valuable, embryo research to develop abortifacients or embryonic
stem cell lines is morally reprehensible. Even those who find embryo research
of all kinds morally neutral may experience moral anxiety in egg or embryo
donation simply because it brings to the forefront their lack of moral engagement with an issue that is so morally relevant for most others. Thus, tiered
consent procedures that encourage or demand the adoption of decision-making
heuristics are likely to disserve potential tissue providers by alienating them
from a true possibility of making choices according to their interests, and this
disservice is only exacerbated as the emotional or moral stakes of tissue provision increase.
149. See supra Part II.A.
150. On the lability of preferences, see Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1167-70 (2003).
151. See, e.g., Mick et ai., supra note 90, at 208.
152. E.g., Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 84, at 999.
153.Id.
154.Id.
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B. Checking Out
Again, results showing that individuals in situations of hyperchoice attempt to "check out" of decision making and perform less well when decisions
are made 155 are troubling in thinking about informed consent and tiered consent models. According to these research results, presenting potential tissue
providers with more options to which they may consent is likely to lead to less
informed decision making if potential tissue providers arbitrarily select options
in a tiered consent menu or attempt to opt out of making a decision by checking a blanket consent option. Alternatively, hyperchoice in tiered consent
could lead to less tissue overall being provided for research, as potential tissue
providers choose to opt out of providing tissue altogether because the prospect
of decision making is too overwhelming. These behavior patterns appear especially likely to manifest in contexts like tiered consent, in which the highly
technical nature of medical research and the relative inability of the ordinary
tissue provider to understand the nuances of proposed research categories
coincide with a potentially large number of categories about which to process
information.
The results on sequential decision making are particularly significant. 156
Tiered consent demands sequential decision making because tissue providers
are permitted and encouraged to consider providing tissue to multiple types of
research. Thus, choosing one research option does not necessarily preclude
selection of all others. Indeed, because each option represents an independent
opportunity to provide tissue for research, tiered consent is more likely than
consumer hyperchoice to present difficulties associated with sequential decision making. Most studies on sequential decision making track numerous
binary (yes-no) choices-precisely the type of decision making that occurs in
tiered consent. Evidence of psychological fatigue leading to less informed
decision making suggests that even where tissue providers strive to make
informed decisions, they may simply be psychologically incapable of doing so
in the repeated iterations required for extensive tiered consent.
None of these outcomes is desirable-from either an informed consent or
an efficient research perspective. Opting out and arbitrary selection brought
about by hyperchoice obfuscate the basic purpose of offering tiered consent,
which is permitting tissue providers to exercise control over the destiny of
their tissue (and, more specifically, their genetic material) while minimizing
administrative monitoring costs. More generally, consent theory and doctrine
are concerned with the design of processes that facilitate informed choice, and
therefore both uninformed authorization and uninformed refusal are problematic.

155. See supra Part U.B.
156.ld.
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C. Regret
Finally, findings regarding patterns of regret in decision making are
significant in the context of consent. 157 These patterns of regret matter to
evaluation of informed consent processes because regret, or fear of regret, may
lead to opting out of decision making. As observed above, opting out undermines the purposes of informed consent generally and the delicate balance
between control and efficiency sought in tiered consent in particular. IS8
Regret is likely to appear with greater force in the context of tiered consent than in settings of consumer choice. Findings on regret show that extensive choice can be demotivating when the decision to be made is a trivial
one-whether to buy jam, write an extra-credit essay, or accept chocolates
rather than cash as compensation. IS9 When the stakes of decision making are
higher, as in the provision of tissues for research purposes, the possibilities for
regret are likewise greater. Indeed, Iyengar and Lepper identify medical decisions as those that are likely to exacerbate the demotivating effects of hyperchoice, as these are decisions "in which [] the costs associated with making the
'wrong' choice, or even beliefs that there are truly 'wrong' choices, are much
more prominent, and/or [] substantial time and effort would be required for
choosers to make truly informed comparisons among alternatives."I60 In other
words, while abundant choice alone may be sufficient to trigger reactions of
regret in decision making, these reactions are amplified as decision making is
laden with emotional or moral weight.
As noted in Part lILA, providing eggs and embryos for research, for
example, is often fraught with moral significance, and tissue providers may
have strong opinions about different types of embryo research. Even for those
who view egg and embryo provision and related research as morally neutral,
the consent-provision process-the need to think about what research projects
constitute ethical egg and embryo research-may be emotionally burdensome.
The act of providing these traditionally "special" tissues for research may
bring about feelings of moral inadequacy, a sense that "I ought to care more
(and if! don't, what's wrong with me?}." Yet, egg and embryo research is not
unique in its moral valence. Individuals may hold strong views about the ethics of commercial research, especially where research may lead to the production of pharmaceutical or other products that they and others may not be able
to access because of limited financial resources. Tissue providers of all kinds
may also feel morally implicated where their genetic material is used in the
hunt for certain kinds of genetic relationships-for example, between sex and
spatial reasoning skills or between race and intelligence. Because cells from
any part of the body may be used in these kinds of research projects, these
concerns apply equally to human embryos, excised cancer tissue, and routine

157. See supra Part D.C.
158. See supra Part D.B.
159. See supra Part D.C.
160. Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 84, at 1004.
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blood samples. 161 While the government may not be able to prohibit these
kinds of genetic studies from going forward,162 surely private individuals
should be permitted to make their strongly held preferences known and to have
those preferences respected.
Regret in hyperchoice decision making may tum not only on the moral
weight accorded to the decision, but also on the nature of the decision and
relationship between the choices offered. For some tissues, selecting A may in
fact effectively preclude selecting B, C, and D, simply because the tissue in
question (for example, human eggs) is a finite and discrete resource. Alternatively, regret may result as much from trying to do too much as from trying to
select one item among many. Regret in these instances may manifest as a
result of sequential decision making, with its attendant increasing fatigue and
psychological strain. 163 In this vein, one group of researchers notes that our
multiple consumer obligations-more choices, but less time-"may not contribute as much to quality of life as once thought or hoped fOr."I64 This suggests that anguish in decision making does not arise solely from the
opportunity costs of giving up other options, but may also result from trying to
take part in too many opportunities at the same time. As our commitments to
autonomy and control inform tiered consent, the psychology of regret threatens to cause tissue providers, once again, either to opt out or, ultimately, to
view the consent-provision process negatively.
Emerging research about the implications of hyperchoice and the psychology of decision making thus suggest definite and significant limits for both the
number of options available in a tiered consent menu and the amount of information that potential tissue providers can process about each option. Additionally, in some instances these findings seem to bear more heavily on some
kinds of tissue research than on others. For instance, providers of human eggs
and embryos may experience fewer difficulties arising from sequential decision making owing to the fact that these tissues are more likely to be finite
research resources. Yet, these providers may experience greater difficulties
arising from classic consumer choice problems (they may be unable to provide
tissue for every category of research they deem worthwhile), as well as possibly greater moral unease about providing reproductive tissue for research of
different kinds. Alternatively, while providers of cancer tissue or blood samples may be able to supply sufficient tissue for any and all research categories
they find worthwhile, these individuals will face greater stress arising from
sequential decision making.

161. See supra Pan I.C.
162. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et aI., Can Science Be Inopportune? Constitutional Validity
ofGovemmental Restrictions on Race-IQ Research, 31 UCLA L. REV. 128, 160-63 (1983); John
A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV.
1203,1212-14 (1978).
163. See supra Pans n.B, m.B.
164. Mick et aI., supra note 90, at 207.
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In all of these instances, findings that information overload causes decision makers to opt out of decision making, to make less informed decisions
when they participate, and to experience greater feelings of regret over decision making make clear that information dumping is inconsistent with the
principles underlying the doctrine of informed consent. Despite current medical practices to disclose any and all information as a shield to liability (and the
greater legal imperative to disclose in the context of research), presenting
potential tissue providers with a large number of options, or excessive information about these options, may lead to consent procedures that are less, rather
than more, worthy of legal and ethical support. Tiered consent, while very
likely a best practice for human tissue research, must be designed with full
cognizance of and appreciation for the limitations of the human mind in order
to better facilitate decision making that is truly informed and freely given.
-------~-------

As human tissue research proliferates, research institutions and
biorepositories, and those crafting the policies that govern these entities, will
face increasing pressure to make more tissue available for more projects.
Meanwhile, those concerned with ensuring informed consent will surely press
for enhanced protection for those providing tissue for research, such as the
inclusion of more research categories in existing tiered consent forms. Somewhere along this spectrum, legislators, agencies, and courts will have to carve
out reasonable policies that respect the interests of both tissue providers and
researchers. At the very least, this charge demands a change in existing standards to include human tissue research in, rather than exempt it from, the legal
rules and doctrines governing human subjects research generally. Moreover, in
an effort to strike a balance between competing interests in ethical conduct and
efficient research, policymakers should affirmatively encourage or mandate
tiered consent as a best practice. The precise details of what tiered consent
should contain must be informed by findings about cognitive limitations leading to lower quality decision making, checking out, and regret in situations of
hyperchoice. While a specific number or description of categories is premature
at this time (and must await future study), the implications of consumer psychology for tiered consent and abundant choice stand as a stark caution sign
that increasing providers' options will not always create correspondingly
greater provider control.
Barry Schwartz, a scholar of the psychology of decision making, suggests
that the data on hyperchoice mean that we "would be well served to rethink
[our] worship of choice.,,165 Indeed, in providing examples of how America is
overly obsessed with choice, Schwartz highlights the bedrock principles of
patient autonomy, writing, "medical ethicists treat the idea of 'patient autonomy' as sacrosanct, as if it goes without saying that having patients choose

165. Schwartz, supra note 143, at 74.
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their treatments will make them better off."I66 Schwartz's sentiment seems
quite overstated, even if well-intentioned. Patient autonomy is important, not
in the least because we have learned on several occasions how detrimental
medical paternalism and lack of consent can be. 167 Moreover, even Schwartz
admits that some choice is essential to human happiness and well-being. 168
Schwartz's point, however, is well taken. Excessive choice may lead to
lower quality decision making--decision making that is less informed and that
makes use of information that is less well understood. The risks of hyperchoice are real and significant. Essentializing and the fatigue associated with
sequential decision making risk consent that is not informed. Arbitrary selection, opting out, and fear of regret about making the wrong morally relevant
choice threaten to undermine potential tissue providers' desire to provide tissue for meaningful research.
Still, tiered consent is likely to be the best way forward for obtaining
appropriate consent from tissue providers. All available evidence demonstrates
that having some choice is far preferable to having none (other than between
participation and nonparticipation). Project-specific consent is likewise unattractive not only for its persisting administrative difficulties, but also because
it poses psychological burdens of its own. Thus, tiered consent, despite the
potential pitfalls of information overload and hyperchoice, continues to represent the most promising methodology for serving the principles of disclosure,
understanding, competency, voluntariness, and authorization that under gird
informed consent-and doing so without overburdening either tissue providers
or the research system.
Further empirical research on the psychology of decision making and the
scope of information load is needed, especially research focused on decisions
made outside of the consumer context. In the first instance, it is unclear
whether the ideal set sizes observed in consumer settings are applicable to
informed consent. Various studies have shown that, with respect to consumer
decision making, set sizes of six are preferable to those of thirty,169 sets of six
are preferable to those of twenty-four,170 and sets of three or six are preferable

166.ld.
167. The Nuremburg Code resulted from the post-World WaI II trials of doctors conducting
unethical medical experiments on persons in concentration camps. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (George 1. Annas & Michael
A. Grodin eds., 1992) (providing a history and analysis of the Nazi experiments, the Nuremberg
trials, the Nuremberg Code, and its relationship to modem medical ethics). The American experience includes the Tuskegee experiments, in which African American men infected with syphilis
were monitored, but left untreated, so that reseaIChers could observe the disease's progression.
None of this reseaIch was done with informed p3Ilicipant consent. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, The Tuskegee Timeline (May 23, 2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nchstplodltuskegeel
time.htm.
168. SCHWARTZ, supra note 81, at 3.
169. IyengaI & Lepper, supra note 84, at 999.
170. ld. at 997-98.
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to sets of nine. 171 Meanwhile, research also shows that sets of both six and
thirty are preferable to no-choice conditions. 172 These results certainly support
the conclusion that tiered consent is preferable to blanket consent; some choice
is preferable to virtually none. Yet, do these results also indicate that tiered
consent menus should include fewer than nine options? Intuitively, a list of
roughly ten options seems likely to be a reasonable approximation of what the
human mind can handle. This intuition lends additional support to my previous
recommendation of a tiered consent of eight options for providing eggs for
third-party use in Canada. 173 Still, this conclusion is simply an intuition, and its
persuasive force is far from obvious, especially given the considerable complexity of the options in a tiered consent menu. Only with greater empirical
findings can tiered consent models be appropriately designed to support and
facilitate the choice and autonomy of tissue providers, while not overburdening potential tissue providers through information overload likely to lead individuals to opt out of decision making.
The importance of this research should not be underestimated. Numerous
legal and ethics experts have already called for comprehensive changes in or
wholesale replacement of national regulations and legal standards governing
the provision of human tissue for research. 174 Expert bodies and ongoing research industries have advocated, and in some instances already adopted,
tiered consent as a best practice. 175 As legislators, agencies, and courts, working with ethicists and researchers, tum to implementing the best practice of
tiered consent, they must be cognizant that, in an effort to give tissue providers
choice, they do not instead end up undermining the essence of informed consent.

171. Id. at 996 (discussing Danielle Timmermans, The Impact of Task Complexity on
Information Use in Multi-Attribute Decision Making, 61. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 95
(1993) (finding that decision makers used an elimination strategy twenty-one percent of the time
when presented with three options, thirty-one percent of the time when presented with six option,
and seventy-seven percent of the time when presented with nine options)).
172. /d. at 1002--{)3.
173. Ram, supra note 5, at 24.
174. See, e.g., Ashburn et a!., supra note 20, at 3378 (observing that "the current system for
protecting tissue donors, which has worked in well in the past, is becoming and will continue to
become increasingly obsolete"); Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A Prospective

Regulatory Framework for Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue Samples and Health
Information, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 737 (1999) (criticizing the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission's 1999 report for confining itself to the structures of the Common Rule, and offering
an alternative proposal that departs from the Common Rule's framework); Robert F. Weir, The
Ongoing Debate About Stored Tissue Samples, Research, and Informed Consent, in 2 NAT'L
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at F-I, F-18 (recommending an update to the
Common Rule's provisions regarding informed consent and waiver of informed consent).
175. See, e.g., EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 134 (advocating tiered consent as a best
practice); NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at 64-65 (same); Ram, supra note
5 (same); Model Consent, supra note 73 (employing tiered consent in the model informed consent
document for the National Cancer Institute); Univ. of S. Me. Bioethics Project, supra note 76.
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